Meeting summary: Monero Research Lab, 5 October 2022
This is a comprehensive summary, with added reference links, of the MRL meeting1 from October 5th 2022, 1700 UTC.
Logs
The raw, unedited, full log file for this meeting:
221005-mrl.log (57 lines)
Summary
Note: it is possible that some relevant information may be missing from this summary; read the full log file for the complete, unedited discussion.
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Participants: 9 (UkoeHB2, rbrunner3, dangerousfreedom4, vtnerd5, ArticMine6, Rucknium7, jberman8, premined_POS9, isthmus10)
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(1) Updates
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(1.1) on outreach initiatives / MRL recruitment efforts11:
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Rucknium noted that the MAGIC Monero Fund12 will soon submit its grant application to some research grant databases in hopes of attracting more researchers
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(1.2) on Seraphis13 (library, bug fixes, wallet, audit framework14):
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dangerousfreedom has been investigating the grootle proofs in seraphis and trying to make a parallel implementation of it in an attempt to correct any potential flaws
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UkoeHB was planning to focus on the remaining seraphis library updates: finish unit testing legacy balance recovery for the legacy-seraphis transition, add legacy inputs to multisig, add coinbase tx type
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jberman finished work on PR #856615 (wallet2: fix rescanning tx via scan_tx) and was getting ready to finish background sync mode, before moving on to Seraphis wallet work
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rbrunner found the Seraphis library interesting after taking a closer look at the code
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vtnerd was considering dropping the planned noise method due to fingerprinting
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(1.4) on multisig security proofs:
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jberman reported that no answer was received from veorq one week after contact and he was still waiting on a response from the Inference18 security team
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(2) Open discussions
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(2.1) on the need for a Seraphis formal peer review:
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dangerousfreedom was wondering about the legal implications of formality and if there is a real need for a ‘paper’ of Seraphis to be peer-reviewed
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UkoeHB noted that the seraphis composition proof is a novel scheme and it is standard practice to at least have security proofs for signature schemes
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premined_POS pointed out that precautions, redundancy and tests are good even in trivial scenarios
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Rucknium thought that a formal peer review is important and a paper is the best way to have a review of the math, noting that in case of a critical error, the Monero network would probably be destroyed
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UkoeHB answered rbrunner’s question about the current state of security proofs for Seraphis: it’s in limbo until I get a chance to properly refresh the paper; after that we need to find someone to help us
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Let me know if you find this kind of report helpful.
Feedback, edits always welcome @/about.
-3RA
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https://github.com/UkoeHB/ ↩
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https://github.com/rbrunner7/ ↩
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https://github.com/DangerousFreedom1984/ ↩
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https://github.com/vtnerd/ ↩
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https://libredd.it/user/ArticMine ↩
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https://github.com/Rucknium/ ↩
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https://github.com/j-berman/ ↩
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@premined_POS:matrix.org ↩
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https://github.com/mitchellpkt ↩
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https://libredd.it/pkg3d6/ ↩
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https://magicgrants.org/funds/monero/ ↩
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https://github.com/UkoeHB/Seraphis ↩
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/dangerousfreedom1984-ccs-proposal-seraphis-cli-wallet-audit-framework/ ↩
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https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/8566 ↩
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https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/8028 ↩
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https://noiseprotocol.org/ ↩
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https://inference.ag/ ↩